Introduction arents depend on primarycare pediatricians for far more than health maintenance and the treatment of acute illness. They often also want the doctor's support and advice regarding medical treatment that the pediatrician will not manage directly. Most often, this involves a recommendation to see a particular subspecialist or surgeon or help in choosing among therapeutic options for a major or chronic illness. At times, however, parents turn to pediatricians for counseling on far weightier decisions, such as whether to pursue risky treatment for rare conditions. Such treatment frequently requires the family to travel to one of the few faraway tertiarycare centers that can provide the services in question. Examples might the pediatrician and family agree to forgo a referral for a possibly lifesaving treatment? The following patient report is intended to provide a focus for consideration. To limit the scope of the discussion, only situations that permit deliberation and delay will be considered.
Patient Report
Stevie Jones is a 2.5-year-old girl in your practice in a medium-sized city approximately 200 miles from a pediatric tertiary-care center. Shortly after birth, she developed hyperbilirubinemia with a large direct fraction. Studies done in your hospital suggested some sort of bile-duct obstruction. Bilirubin did not increase to dangerous levels immediately. You therefore arranged for a pediatric gastroenterologist to see her on day 5 of life. Additional studies revealed biliary atresia.
Stevie's gastroenterologist explained various options for treat-ment to the parents. She noted that some specialists recommended no immediate surgical intervention, except for placement of the child on a waiting list for liver transplantation. She added that others felt the Kasai operation could provide valuable time for the child to grow, increasing the likelihood of a successful transplant. The subspecialist relayed all this information to you in a telephone call and said she had sent the family home to consider the alternatives. She indicated that her center's pediatric surgeons had excellent results with the Kasai procedure, and she had recommended that approach to the parents.
After several long discussions with you, Stevie's parents elected to have Stevie undergo the Kasai procedure. All went well, and she returned home after a relatively short hospitalization. Over the next 2 years, Stevie had a remarkably easy time. She grew well, made only routine visits to the gastroenterologist, and saw you for primary care. Then, Stevie experienced her first major complication. She developed cholangitis and had to be admitted to the pediatric center.
Over the next 3 or 4 months, it became clear that the infection had caused so much damage that liver failure seemed imminent.
Stevie's parents now come to talk with you, leaving Stevie with her grandparents. They say that they have been reading a great deal about liver transplantation and had an opportunity to talk about transplants with Stevie's doctors and nurses while she was in the hospital for cholangitis. While the center did not do pediatric liver transplantation, the staff there cared for children who had had such surgery elsewhere and needed follow-up closer to their homes. The parents had come away from their reading and their discussions feeling that transplantation involved too many potential burdens for their daughter and their family. They felt that Stevie would be better off if she were simply kept comfortable and allowed to die peacefully. Stevie's parents know that such a course would require your cooperation and want your advice.
Issues Consent
Following legal doctrine in the United States, pediatricians and others have unfortunately fallen into the habit of using the term &dquo;consent&dquo; in regard to choices made for minor children who cannotby virtue of age, mental capacity, or immaturitycontribute to decisions about their own medical care. The word more properly applies to agreements by an individual for himself or herself. With respect to children, we might better use the term &dquo;permission.&dquo; That is, parents authorize treatment for their children on the grounds that family members (1) generally care more for one another than do strangers, including doctors, and (2) have broad discretion granted by society to raise children in a variety of acceptable ways.
In any case, parental permis- One problem involves the ability of the primary-care pediatrician who has had little or no direct experience with the proposed treatment to provide sufficient information, interpret all the material available to the parents, and counsel them. That is, can parents learn enough through books, material sent from a faraway center, and discussions with the pediatrician, or do they really need to see for themselves? Should the doctor always urge at least an evaluation and firsthand encounter at the center? No single answer suggests itself.
Individual pediatricians must decide how familiar they have to be with perilous treatments carried out elsewhere before they feel competent to address parents' questions and concerns.
Primary-care pediatricians may wish to remember that their longterm relationships with families generally put them in an excellent position to provide counseling focused on the values and preferences that parents hold dear. The alliance of trust built with families over years may permit greater openness and less fear or sense of helpless dependence that characterize interactions with the tech-nically oriented experts at tertiarycare centers. Discussions with subspecialists often take place in a somewhat charged atmosphere characterized by an understandable bias toward providing the interventions they have worked long and hard to perfect. In addition, the experts often face many desperately ill patients simultaneously, leaving them physically and emotionally overburdened. The lack of technical knowledge about specialized care that worries the primary-care pediatrician may be more than offset by greater personal knowledge of the family and an ability to create a more favorable atmosphere for decision-making.
Benefits vs Burdens
Our society wants parents, doctors, and others involved in the care of children to accommodate the best interests of each child. The problem in cases such as the one presented here is to determine what that phrase means. We often appeal to those words as if they were some sort of code that cuts through all the difficult medical and ethical judgments involved in deciding whether a child should begin a course of treatment associated with substantial risk. Does an 85% 1-year survival rate after liver transplantation for a 2.5-year-old in Stevie's situationa figure consistent with results in major centersconstitute treatment that is clearly in her best interests? Actuarial survival statistics don't tell the whole story. Such figures tell us little about what the first postoperative year was like. How many patients had major complications and had to return to the operating room for bleeding, bowel perforation, retransplantation? How many had prolonged stays in intensive-care units for life-threatening infections or other problems? Moreover, the figures say little about the long-term risks associated with chronic or recurrent rejection, with lymphoproliferative diseasewhich may become malignantor with kidney and lipid disorders secondary to therapy with cyclosporine.
The point is not to suggest that with all those scary problems, no sane physician would allow a child to undergo liver transplantation. Rather, we need to respond with compassion and understanding when parents develop reservations based on the potential burdens of transplantation and feel that their child should not have to endure the possible complications. But do compassion and understanding imply acceptance? Perhaps the parents' fears seem unjustified, given the remarkable progress in transplantation in recent years and published information suggesting that most children with liver failure enjoy an excellent quality of life after the transplant. In other words, has transplantation become a standard of care that no child should be denied simply because his or her parents are apprehensive about it? Many &dquo;heroic&dquo; therapies such as liver transplantation have, in one sense, become standards of care. That is, in many situations, no other treatment has any prospect of success; at least in some specialized institutions, doctors provide the treatment of last resort rather frequently -20 times a year or more. Does this sense of standard constitute a moral obligation? If it does, we would probably say we would have to contact our local child protective service agency in any cases of parental refusal and request an investigation for the purpose of seeking court-ordered treatment. With this in mind, do we want to say that Stevie's parents, like Christian Scientists who refuse an appendectomy, have medically neglected their child?
Most pediatricians would not equate religion-based parental refusal of a laparotomy with a considered decision to forgo liver transplantation. The distinction between the two decisions has at least two components. First, and easiest, the potential risks and burdens of transplantation far exceed those of an appendectomy, at least regarding the likelihood of lifethreatening complications. Second, but far more difficult, we have some sense that the decision not to have a transplant rests on rational grounds, rather than the inherent irrationality of religious beliefs. We all have a much harder time deciding just how &dquo;good&dquo; -how logical, consistent, verifiableparents' decisions must be before we reject their decisions and seek to supervene their authority. (Ironically, we don't often examine parents' reasons, which may be at least as irrational, when they accept recommended treatment.)
In Stevie's case, then, we can recognize that the burdens of treatment could be seen by reasonable persons to outweigh the alternative of a peaceful death. the sensible limits of efforts to save ever-smaller preterm babies in greater numbers have led to cautions from a few commentators.
Families do have legitimate concerns beyond the interests of one sick child. In a family of marginal 
A Final Judgment
We may not be able to come up with a universal answer for all pediatricians. It may help to remember, however, that individuals view objective medical information, such as survival statistics, through the lenses of values and personal experience. What seems risky for one may feel safe for another. Determining whether or not to support the family's decision not to take Stevie far away for liver transplantation will depend on an evaluation of the adequacy of the information accumulated by the primary-care physician and the family about the proposed treatment. Most important is the mutual understanding of the likelihood of success, what might go wrong, and how often complications typically ensue.
Given adequate information and understanding, physician and family can try to put the alternatives in perspective. If the parents judge the potential burdens to be too high and seem to have no inherent conflict of interest, such as having always favored the child in question least among several siblings, it seems reasonable to support a decision to forgo the treatment. Without sufficient information and understanding, it seems more prudent to urge the family at least to take the child for an evaluation and seize the opportunity to explore the situation more fully. If the parents refuse even that step, the pediatrician will have to evaluate the basis for the family's refusal. Suspicion of major conflicts of interest probably warrants a referral to the appropriate child protective agency. Lacking such suspicions, the pediatrician will have to decide whether government intrusion into a delicate matter of private judgment is justified.
In most cases, legitimate conflicts of value rather than of interest will be found, making it impossible to urge the state to prevail over parental authority. 
